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Automatic Perfection of Sales of Payment
Intangibles: A Trap for the Unwary
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
Under Section 9-309(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, sales of
"payment intangibles" are automatically perfected without the requirement
of filing financing statements. Originally intended as a concession to the
banking industry (to perfect sales of loan participations without filing), this
automatic-perfection provision has become a trap for the unwary--
including unwary banks. The provision misleads those who think they are
buying payment intangibles (and thus need not file to perfect) only to find
out, too late, that a court has construed that arcane definition too narrowly.
The provision also undermines the ability to know one's priority in
purchased or pledged payment intangibles. This essay analyzes these
problems, examines their historical origins, and suggests potential
solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A bank pays $47 million, fair value, to purchase certain rights to
payment under equipment leases. The seller of these rights eventually goes
bankrupt, and its trustee in bankruptcy claims that the seller-not the bank-
actually owns these rights even though they were purportedly sold. This
nightmarish scenario is real, and indeed has been "blessed" by a bankruptcy
court.1 Most troubling, the trustee in bankruptcy's claim and the bankruptcy
court's decision are not based on any hint of fraud or inequities; rather, they
result from a well intentioned, though misguided, provision of Revised
Article 9 (Revised Article 9) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)-
section 9-309(3), providing for automatic perfection of sales of payment
intangibles.
* Copyright © 2007 by Steven L. Schwarcz. Stanley A. Star Professor of Law &
Business, Duke University School of Law; Founding Director, Global Capital Markets
Center. E-mail: Schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The author thanks Chuck Mooney and Bill
Burke for excellent comments on drafts of this essay.
I Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Netbank, FSB (In re Commercial Money Ctr.,
Inc.), 2005 WL 1365055 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2005). While this Article was being
edited, the bankruptcy court's decision was overturned on appeal by a bankruptcy
appellate panel insofar as it relates to the payment intangibles issue. See NetBank, FSB
(In re Commercial Money Ctr, Inc.) v. Kipperman, 350 B.R. 465 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2006).
That does not, however, change either the analysis or the concerns articulated in this
Article. Also, although the author is a consultant to NetBank in this litigation, he was
concerned about this problem long before he was retained as a consultant, and the views
expressed in this Article are entirely his own.
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"Automatic perfection" means that sales of payment intangibles are
perfected when they occur,2 without the need to file financing statements
(filing being the U.C.C.'s default rule for perfection). 3 The automatic
perfection rule originated in a political compromise between the drafters of
Revised Article 9 and the banking lobby. When Revised Article 9 expanded
the category of intangible rights whose sale was governed by the U.C.C., 4
banks realized the expansion would include loan participations, a form of
payment intangible consisting of undivided interests in loans. 5 They then
became concerned that requiring perfection by filing could be burdensome
and costly to the large inter-bank market in loan-participation sales.
Banks argued that, prior to Revised Article 9, they were not required to
file financing statements to perfect sales of loan participations, 6 so automatic
perfection would simply reflect existing banking practice. 7 Although the
drafters of Revised Article 9 ultimately accepted automatic perfection as a
compromise, this essay shows that it is a compromise that creates traps for
the unwary-and that, ironically, banks are among those most likely to fall
into these traps.
II. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY AUTOMATIC PERFECTION
Automatic perfection causes two fundamental problems--one a "non-
perfection" problem, the other a "priority" problem. The non-perfection
problem results from certain complexities and subtleties, discussed in the
next paragraph, associated with the term "payment intangibles." These
complexities and subtleties can make it difficult for a buyer of intangible
rights to determine whether its rights are payment intangibles, which are
automatically perfected, or other intangible rights for which the U.C.C.
2 Or, more technically, when they "attach" under U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2005).
3 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2005).
4 The U.C.C. governs certain sales of intangible rights to "avoid [] difficult problems
of distinguishing between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and
those in which the receivable has been sold outright," since in "many commercial
financing transactions the distinction [between these transactions] is blurred." U.C.C. § 9-
109 cmt. 4 (2005). Another reason is to apply Article 9's perfection and priority system
to those sales. See Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) Commentary No. 14 on U.C.C. [Pre-
Revision] § 9-102(1)(b) (1994).
5 For a detailed discussion of loan participations, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1557-61 (2001) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk].
6 U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (2005).
7 Id. (stating that § 9-309(3) "reflect[s] the practice under former Article 9"). But see
infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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requires filing for perfection. If the buyer decides wrong and does not file,
the buyer's ownership of those rights can be avoided in the event of the
seller's subsequent bankruptcy. Avoidance occurs through the mechanism of
U.C.C. section 9-317(a)(2), which provides that an unperfected security
interest-which, under U.C.C. sections 1-201(b)(35) and 9-109 (and Official
Comment 5 thereto), includes most ownership interests in intangible rights-
is subordinate to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy. 8
Payment intangibles are defined as "general intangible[s] under which
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation." 9
Confusion can arise because the term "general intangible" is a catch-all,
consisting effectively of all intangible rights "other than accounts, chattel
paper," and other such U.C.C.-delineated categories of intangible rights. In
order to conclude an intangible right is a payment intangible, one must first
conclude it does not fall within any of these other categories. These
categories, however, can be complex and exceedingly subtle.
For example, in In re Commercial Money Center, the intangible rights at
issue consisted of rights to payment to certain lease installments. NetBank
believed, in my view correctly, that these intangible rights were payment
intangibles, not falling within any other U.C.C.-delineated category of
intangible rights. The trustee in bankruptcy argued, though, that these
intangible rights constituted "chattel paper" because that term includes "a
record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a ... lease of
specific goods."' 0 Although NetBank countered that the intangible rights
could not be chattel paper because they neither constitute a "record" nor
"evidence" the lease-rather, they were merely rights payable under the
lease-the bankruptcy judge disagreed. Holding (in my view, incorrectly)
that the intangible rights were chattel paper, the judge then concluded
(correctly, given that flawed premise) that their sale required perfection by
filing. Because NetBank had not filed financing statements, it was
unperfected.
The disagreement over the U.C.C. nature of rights to payment under
leases illustrated by the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Commercial
Money Center is disturbing because that should have been a relatively easy
8 U.C.C. section 9-317(a)(2) technically provides that an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of a "lien creditor," but lien creditor is defined in
U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(52)(c) to include a trustee in bankruptcy. Accord 11 U.S.C.
§ 544 (2005) (the "strong arm" provision of bankruptcy law, through which avoidance
would likewise occur).
9 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2005).
10 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(1 1) (2005).
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case.11 Two prominent commercial law commentators have observed, for
example:
Our biggest concern about the [bankruptcy court's decision in In re
Commercial Money Center] case is its holding that the rental streams,
standing by themselves, should be characterized as chattel paper rather than
payment intangibles. The court thought its decision was true to the "plain
language" of the U.C.C., but that's questionable ..... The carved-out
payment streams seem to fit the definition of "'payment intangible" like a
glove.12
Indeed, it appears that banks may routinely regard rights to payment
under leases as payment intangibles, and therefore do not file to perfect the
sale of those rights. 13
That this degree of controversy exists for so obvious an example of a
payment intangible augers poorly for the many truly more difficult cases.
And the In re Commercial Money Center bankruptcy court's interpretation of
§ 9-309(3), if sustained on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, only compounds the
controversy, suggesting, for example, that even participations in equipment
loans could be chattel paper whose sale requires perfection by filing. 14
Some might propose solving this problem by filing financing statements
for all sales of intangible rights, as a prophylactic measure. But § 9-309(3)
would still remain a trap for the unwary who, after reading § 9-309(3),
justifiably believe they are automatically perfected and fail to file
prophylactically. Furthermore, any widespread practice of prophylactic filing
for sales of intangible rights could amount to roughly the same filing. costs
and burdens as simply requiring such filing in the first place. Additionally,
even a universal practice of prophylactic filing could not solve the "priority"
problem (discussed below), which exists independently of the non-perfection
problem.
The priority problem occurs because automatic perfection makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to know one's priority in purchased or pledged
11 Cf supra, note 1 (overturning that case).
12 Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, Rental Payment Streams Are "Chattel Paper"
Rather than "Payment Intangibles," CLARK'S SEC. TRANS. MoNTHLY, Aug. 2005, at 3
(emphasis added).
13 Interview with Charles Mooney, Charles A. Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Co-Reporter, Revised Article 9 (Jan. 5,
2006).
14 The (twisted) rationale of the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Commercial
Money Center compels this conclusion where, under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(1 1), the
equipment loans themselves are secured by security interests in specific goods.
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payment intangibles. Whereas the U.C.C. filing system not only establishes
but also enables one to ascertain priority, payment intangibles sold pursuant
to an automatic perfection rule do not require filing. Any subsequent buyer
of, or party secured by, those payment intangibles must therefore take the
transferor's word that such intangibles have not been previously sold. If the
transferor is dishonest-indeed, even if the transferor is merely mistaken
about the existence of a prior sale-the subsequent buyer or secured party's
interest would be subordinate to the rights of prior automatically perfected
buyers. The inability to know ownership priority in turn undermines the
market for selling intangible rights and increases costs where sales do
occur. i5
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS
There are at least a couple of potential solutions to these problems. Each
begins by substituting a perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment
intangibles in place of Revised Article 9's automatic perfection rule.
One solution is simply to eliminate the automatic perfection rule for sales
of payment intangibles. These sales then would be perfected by filing-the
U.C.C.'s default rule.16 This was the originally intended approach of Revised
Article 9.
This solution is likely to meet resistance because sales of loan
participations then technically would also require filing for perfection and, as
mentioned, the banking lobby has been concerned that such a requirement
would be burdensome and costly to the market in inter-bank loan-
participation sales.17 Banks believed, in contrast, that automatic perfection
merely reflects pre-Revised Article 9 banking practice. 18
That belief may be misplaced, however. The fact that the sale of loan
participations was not included within the scope of the U.C.C. prior to
Revised Article 9 says nothing about whether an automatic perfection rule
then existed. Absent U.C.C. coverage, perfection of sales of loan
participations prior to Revised Article 9 was governed by the common law
15 Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection System for Cross-Border
Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 462-69 (1999) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Centralized Perfection System] (examining the difficulty of knowing priority
absent a filing system, and the high cost of not knowing priority).
16 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 5 and following text.
18 See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (2005).
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and lex mercatoria.19 That hodgepodge of laws in some cases resulted in
automatic perfection of sales of loan participations but in many cases did not;
and where it did not, it imposed even more burdensome and costly perfection
requirements than filing, such as "policing" or notifying obligors on the
loans. 20 Banks rarely, if ever, complied with these burdensome and costly
perfection requirements. 2'
For this reason, many inter-bank sales of loan participations were
unperfected prior to enactment of Revised Article 9. If, therefore, the
automatic perfection rule under § 9-309(3) were replaced by a perfection-by-
filing rule, banks that choose not to file often would be in no worse position
under commercial law than they had been in prior to Revised Article 9:
Because few banks complied with pre-U.C.C. perfection requirements for
sales of loan participations, the failure to comply with a perfection-by-filing
requirement "would put [banks] in no worse position than at present. Banks
would take the insolvency risk of the selling bank, as they likely do now." 22
But banks that decide to comply with such a filing requirement would be
able to perfect the sale of loan participations with far greater certainty. In
short, therefore, replacing automatic perfection of sales of payment
intangibles with a rule requiring perfection by filing would essentially place
banks in a no worse, and arguably a better, position than they were in prior to
Revised Article 9.23
Another possible solution, more explicitly intended to address the
banking industry's perceived concerns, would begin by substituting a
perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment intangibles in place of Revised
Article 9's automatic perfection rule; it then would except out sales of loan
participations between banks. This approach simply recognizes that, "as
between banks... purchases and sales of loan participations are not intended
19 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (providing that commercial transactions not governed by
the U.C.C. are to be governed by principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant).
20 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 956 n.165 (1995) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Statutory Rulemaking Process]; see also Schwarcz, Centralized Perfection
System, supra note 15, at 472-75 (discussing perfection of sales of intangible rights under
non-U.C.C. state law).
21 Schwarcz, Statutory Rulemaking Process, supra note 20, at 956 n. 165.
22 Id.
23 Banks apparently did not worry much in the past about lack of perfection because
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver of failed banks, has a
weaker "strong arm" power than a trustee in bankruptcy to challenge unperfected sales.
But this same weakness of the FDIC to challenge unperfected sales is all the more reason
for banks not to worry about a filing requirement today.
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to facilitate commercial transactions but, instead, constitute a means of
allocating lending risk between such institutions." 24
The exception could take several forms. It could provide, for example,
that excepted sales of loan participations are automatically perfected, as
under Revised Article 9. Alternatively, it could provide, as prior to Revised
Article 9, that excepted sales of loan participations are not governed by
Article 9 of the U.C.C.. In each case, the challenge is to carefully define what
constitutes an excepted sale of loan participations.
At the time Revised Article 9 was being finalized, some claimed that it
would be difficult to precisely define this type of exception. I do not see why.
Loan participations are simply undivided interests in loans,25 and the term
"bank" could be defined, for example, by reference to the expansive but
precise litany of banking institutions that may not be debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code. 26 Indeed my recollection is that a similar approach,
proposed by the American Bar Association's Securitized Asset Financing
Task Force, was substantially adopted in the Revised Article 9 Drafting
Committee's November 1995 draft report.
I understand that because of continued banking industry opposition, this
approach did not become part of Revised Article 9.27 However, in light of the
In re Commercial Money Center debacle and the concerns laid out in this
essay, perhaps it is time that banks recognize that this approach may well
have merit-and that § 9-309(3) represents neither their best interests nor the
best interests of any other buyer or seller of, or party secured by, payment
intangibles.
24 Schwarcz, Statutory Rulemaking Process, supra note 20, at 956 n. 168 (emphasis
added).
25 See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 5 and accompanying text. I recently
learned from Professor Mooney that, at the time Revised Article 9 was being finalized,
banks also were concerned that requiring filing for perfection might burden potential
markets for the inter-bank sale of undivided interests in letters of credit, banker's
acceptances, and other bank products. To the extent a filing requirement jeopardizes any
such markets, inter-bank sales in those markets could, as appropriate, be relieved of filing
requirements along the approach discussed above.
26 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(2) (2005).
27 Professor Mooney recalls that there may have been opposition also from non-
bank financial institutions that buy and sell loan participations. Theoretically, at least, the
approach described in the text above could be adapted to apply to any definable group of
financial institutions.
20071

